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Abstract: How financial institutions do they manage their interface with their decision-making 
context? What is the performance "social" beyond the simple economic and financial performance? 
How can we measure this performance "social"? This article focuses on the theoretical corpus 
contemporary necessary to understand the couple context decision / financial institutions. This is 
basically to contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive approach which captures applied with 
consistency, the conceptual opposition series (role and impact) of the decision context / financial 
institutions structures. Gradually, driven by the reality of change, the paper come to a Copernican 
revolution in the theory of relations between financial institutions and decision context. Standards for 
new perspectives on the role of the financial institutions, it is not the decision-making environment 
that revolves around the sun institutions. Note that this reversal was anticipated in 1965 by Emery and 
Trist in a prophetic article, but it is only recently that we began to theorize in this direction. The 
article finally understood that economic performance is insufficient to ensure the sustainability of the 
organisations, at least for him to avoid problems. We understand that in a multiple rationalities world, 
the issue of "social performance of the financial institutions" is wide open to uncertainty. Everything 
depends on the status that is given to the organization: simple machine to produce cash register for 
shareholders, human community service of another larger community?   
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1. Introduction 
As its name suggests, this article focuses on the theoretical corpus contemporary 
necessary to understand the couple context decision/ financial institutions. This is 
basically to contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive approach which 
captures applied with consistency, the conceptual opposition series (role and 
impact) of the decision context/ financial institutions structures. By necessity, we 
use several readings which are foreign to the ordinary management literature. Some 
theoretical approaches that we examine have even developed without direct 
reference to management science. Is that we are trying to build a problem for 
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which there is still no canonical texts. It is up to us to take our well where he is. Far 
from being a simple juxtaposition of disparate readings, this article is in fact 
organized coherently. Numerous theoretical approaches addressing this problem, 
some are already old, but still widely used. We need to know, as they still dominate 
the current literature. Other currents are emerging. We also need to know them, 
because they are the ones who serve us most in the theoretical proposed 
reorganization. Of course, it is only an overview of the relevant theoretical existing 
inventory. We will do our nest among the currents that attract us the most, without 
losing sight of how they differ from the current interest us less. 
The real difficulty is that contemporary decision-making context is multifaceted 
and allows many different readings for university like the technocrat. Each reading 
is a theoretical approach entirely legitimate. The challenge is therefore to reconcile 
realism and parsimony. The sake of realism leads to descriptions close detail, 
focusing on the real, its peculiarities, its variety, its inconsistencies. We want to 
understand the complexity in the most concrete level; we want to explain by 
drawing on examples. The concern of parsimony leads us instead to limit our 
account of reality to the smallest possible number of concepts (called principle of 
“Occam's razor”, 1285-1347). We want to “do science” and we have articles to 
publish. Between these two extremes, extreme concrete and abstract extreme, the 
multiplicity of reality is open to all imaginable interpretations. That's why we have 
so many theories in this field. They all because somewhere, but they are all 
incomplete and somewhat unrealistic in the other. Our innovative research is to 
find a balance that works for us and allow us to provide the scientific community 
with an insight into the reality that is both new and arouses interest. How we 
navigate the abundance of theoretical approaches available? The recipe is to focus 
on two points: (1) the center of gravity of each stream studied, and (2) the potential 
of the current. 
 
2. Theoretical Creativity and Hybridization 
The classical currents are loaded with useful insights for our purposes, but they are 
less adapted to the realities of the interface financial institutions/ decision-making 
context. They were developed at a time when the decision context of financial 
institutions was easier today, at least a time when researchers considering this 
decision-making context a very reductionist way. Their scientific ideal was specific 
to the market economic approach sparingly: an object of analysis considered 
relatively homogeneous come natural given some explanatory variables, policy 
makers consistently driven by a maximizing rationality, financial institutions 
effectiveness considered the single variable to explain. 
The decision context today is much more complex, and recognized as such. The 
actors are very different, they have powers deliberately neglected in economics, 
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and they are carriers of values that guide them to multiple rationalities, breaking 
with the traditional economic rationality. Effectiveness research is not their sole 
purpose, and even when this is the case, they define very different and 
incompatible ways. They refuse to consider the cost-effectiveness, ethics and 
legitimacy as autonomous areas of investigation. In addition, the decision context 
is rapidly changing. It changes not only quantitatively (eg economic growth), but 
also, and most importantly, qualitatively, that is to say in its own structures (eg 
values, forms of power, the border between public and private, between business 
and decision context). Previously developed theories often poorly applied to 
today's concerns. This is the only real trend in administrative law science. When 
defining the problems otherwise, must other theories to explain them. The name of 
realism, it is important to provide an analytical framework that integrates the first 
change, and secondly all the ecological and ethical economic, social, political, that 
make the complexity of the interface financial institutions/ decision-making 
context. 
How to get there? Conventional theoretical approaches provide us the necessary 
bases. It must be supplemented by new trends. These enrich our analysis 
frameworks in three ways: they clarify the gray areas of the classical theories, they 
draw unthinkable new perspectives in the academic world of partitioned once, and 
finally, they share a concern for interdisciplinary that is precisely one of our own 
objectives. They allow us to better capture the contemporary complexities. This 
enrichment is often the result of hybridization between related disciplines that have 
long ignored. 
Thus, economic sociology attempts to explain economic phenomena with the tools 
of sociology, while institutional economics considering social facts with the 
concepts of economics. Philosophy burst the old models of instrumental rationality, 
which drags itself to new problems. Individualistic social psychology comes to the 
aid of holistic sociology, which in turn gives a contextual framework. The old 
dichotomy between structures and processes is resolved in the constructivist 
approach, whose roots into theology. The other old dichotomy between agency and 
context is a compromise in the theory of the structure. As to the theory of 
organizations, it is enriched by the contributions of political science and ethics 
approach by stakeholders (stakeholders), which opens the field to these disciplines 
often totally new for them now. Management is the notion of “social responsibility 
of business” which calls into question many ideas in management manuals. Last 
vying, the rising ideology of sustainable development and structural changes that 
cause its practice, invite to rethink the analysis received from the past for the sake 
of integration frameworks. This hybridization is therefore not due to chance. It 
arises from a real need to understand that our time. 
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3. The Joint Study 
The study is organized in a logical manner. We begin to justify why we need a new 
epistemology to address this problem financial institutions/ decision-making 
context. Then, we try to understand the various approaches to the scientific object 
“decision context”. We focus subsequently on the analysis of financial institutions 
torque/ decision-making context. The process is gradual. There are first presented 
any two classical approaches still in force. Are then introduced, several approaches 
emerging, which we consider particularly productive for our purposes. Thus, after 
testing our understanding of both applications, we are finalizing the article with a 
theoretical reconfiguration of financial institutions torque/ decision-making 
context. 
First examine how a new epistemology emerges to study our problem, that multiple 
rationalities. The traditional financial institutions theories are usually based on a 
concept of rationality similar to that used by economics (think of the old “scientific 
organization of labor” Taylor and his descendants). This so-called “instrumental” 
rationality explains behavior by maximizing an “objective function” (that is to say 
a measurable satisfaction), or by minimizing costs to avoid (which analytically is 
the same). As stakeholders were considered as mere economic actors, incarnations 
of homo economicus among others (sellers or buyers maximizers), the model of 
instrumental rationality was adequate for the theory. For our purposes, however, 
this model has serious limitations. Maximizing the calculation does not in itself 
explain everything in behavior, except to extend the definition beyond the 
recognizable. 
To picture how many Democrats among you would be willing to barter 
parliamentary democracy against tax cuts an effective dictatorship? Why do so 
many people they donate to Greenpeace or WWF to preserve species? One could 
certainly bring these species in an objective function of satisfaction, because they 
somehow “belong to us”, or at least, they are neighbors. They enrich our quality of 
life, and by saving, perhaps every donor that he selfishly maximizes their 
individual welfare. This is what pretends a utilitarian economist said. How then to 
explain the gifts received from abroad to save these species, or the gesture of the 
people who send their money to preserve a species in a neighboring country that 
has virtually no “utility”? Why are appalled us the deplorable working conditions 
of children working in some Asian factories as they help keep the cost of the 
products they produce lower for us? Maybe some of us will rush to the local mall 
to enjoy it, but others hesitate, and some pure militate actively stop this 
exploitation. We are rational, irrational, or multi-rational? 
Today, to be realistic, we must therefore consider the stakeholders in all decision-
making context of their behavior, some of which do not respond readily to the 
classical rationality of maximizing a stable objective function. Many researchers 
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have thus concluded that in many cases, the behavior of actors is explained less by 
exclusive reference to a calculation by maximizing the “good reasons” that gave 
these actors. The choice of actors could just as well be based on calculations 
(rationality called “instrumental”) on “values” (rationality called “axiological”), 
habits, or rules of behavior regarded as legitimate, and often in spite their cost. The 
most common in scientific paradigms in management standard economic 
rationality will be our starting point. It will be criticized by the so-called 
“postmodern”, “institutionalist” and contemporary “critical” approaches. The aim 
is to show that there are different ways of conceiving of rationality, and therefore 
theories that rely solely on the maximisatrice rationality are at best incomplete, and 
sometimes inaccurate, for our purposes. This postulate multiple rationalities 
however not unanimous and we see throughout the effects of this controversy on 
the available theoretical positions. 
Then, we try to identify the object “decision context”, one of the two elements of 
the financial institutions torque/ decision-making context that is the subject of this 
study. We chose three perspectives that seem useful for conceptualizing the 
interface we financial institutions/ decision-making context. For each, we offer a 
metaphor that sums up the meaning (the famous sake of parsimony). In the first 
perspective we see how economics treats the subject. Its center of gravity is 
efficiency. Logically, it addresses the decision context as a market, but as an 
imperfect market. We start from the neoclassical approach “Welfare Economics” 
(Economic welfare). Favorable market, it nevertheless considers that it is 
“imperfect” and suffers from “failures” (market failures) that cannot be corrected 
naturally. It justifies this by using the sociopolitical intrusion in the market, in the 
form of state intervention in charge to correct these failures. It is in these texts that 
we could approach the reasoning of classical economic type, which still occupies a 
central place in the study of economic decisions, whether public or private policy 
strategy. For many authors, the classic economic model, revised or not by the 
Welfare Economics, is unsurpassable. For others, it is the paradigm down. Among 
economists, both called “institutionalist” schools try to exceed approach Welfare 
Economics. Each recognizes its contribution to a better understanding of socio-
political elements in the economy. However, both accuse her normative, 
prescribing roles for the state regardless of the reality in the Welfare Economics, 
when the market is malfunctioning, the state should simply be to avoid overflow 
because there no other recourse. Institutionalist approaches purport to offer a more 
sophisticated explanation of the socio-political presence in the economy. They are 
also more ambitious, as they extend their analysis to all institutions, not just the 
state. They are part of the same name (“institutionalist”) as they seek both to 
explain the presence of economic institutions (rather than simple exchanges) in the 
decision-making context. Yet they are at loggerheads because they offer radically 
different explanations. 
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For reasons that we will see, we address these currents in the reverse order of their 
appearance. The first stream is the most recent. It is called “neo-institutionalist” (to 
differentiate it from the other, which is earlier, and he adopts the intuitions but 
rejects methods and political connotations). He comes from a triple parentage: the 
political philosophy of liberalism, classical microeconomics and “scientific 
method” (mathematically testable hypotheses). This trend dates back to the sixties. 
This explains the presence of socio-economic institutions by the fact that these 
institutions collectively offer cheaper alternatives to perform certain tasks that the 
multiplication of inter individual exchanges. It forms the basis of what some call 
the “neo-liberalism”. 
The second stream is the oldest. It dates back to the late 19th century. Once called 
simply “institutional economics”, it now refers to the institutionalism “orthodox” 
or Old Institutionalism, to differentiate it from its neo-classical offspring. Policy 
more “social-democratic” (in contemporary terms) sensitivity, it is on him that was 
founded the New Deal in the United States in the 1930s. This current has long 
posed a competitor of neoclassical economics, which he blames his reductionism, 
because starting from the erroneous assumption that economic “social facts”, the 
institutions in particular, would be the simple result aggregation of individual 
economic calculations. He takes it for granted that the socio-economic reality is 
somewhat more complex. Eclectic, it borrows many social sciences, particularly 
sociology, political science and social psychology. His concern for realism led him 
to develop quite complex descriptive models, and reject the canonical scientific 
method, and in particular the mathematical modeling. The controversy between the 
two economic trends called “institutionalist” is often acrimonious. Each accuses 
the other of scientific quackery.  
At this point of the article, we can already make a first observation. We sought to 
conceptualize the “decision context” object, limiting ourselves to a single 
discipline, economic science, a science that is more “scientific” than others. We 
would have thought to find some certainty. This is not the case. The field is across 
multiple controversies, where each object defines its own way, and in fact it 
follows an analysis that has deep differences with those of its competitors. If 
economists merely bring partial lighting (if partial) of our object, perhaps we find 
more serene truths in other disciplines? Do not dream, because of course it is not, 
and it will only get worse as and as we move forward in our theoretical journey. 
Take it otherwise, for example by adopting a more positive formulation: “Of 
course, there is nothing, and that's what makes this exciting product.” The second 
perspective that we have chosen is that of political science. Its center of gravity is 
power. It designs the decision context as a field of places of power. We will 
consider first the exercise of power as a game where the socio-political actors with 
very different interests pursuing their interests through specialized structures (the 
socio-political process). We then focus on the drivers of these game players, 
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pressure groups, examining how they exercise their power. Rethink these theories 
when it comes time to study the stakeholders of the company (stakeholders). The 
third perspective is that of sociology said institutionalist. Logically, it defines the 
decision context as a network of institutions, that is to say, collective rules. There 
are other sociological approaches such as interactionist sociology, constructivist, 
structuralism, phenomenological, and many others who are fighting the truth. In 
sociology, the controversy may be more numerous, more abrasive, and more 
durable than elsewhere. We chose the institutionalist sociology because at this 
point in our study we believe it is the best alternative to oppose the two 
perspectives that we have seen. 
We distinguish here three approaches, which are relatively well together because 
they complement each other. The first approach is that of economic sociology, 
which aims to explain the economic facts by the concepts of sociology. Warning, 
do not confuse with the approach of institutional economics that it applies to 
explain social facts by the concepts of the economy. The difference is not 
insignificant. These are two very different epistemologies that clash, that is to say, 
both theoretical and empirical own devices, sometimes difficult to reconcile, even 
incompatible. Economic sociology is rooted in sociology. Institutional economics 
is rooted in economics. One can hardly imagine a professor specializing in one can 
be engaged in the department of teacher specialized in the other that says it all. The 
second institutionalist approach does not particularly care about the economy. It 
clearly portrays the heart of sociology “sociologizing.” Give him to simplify the 
name institutionalist approach, calling it perhaps “functionalist”, to differentiate it 
from the other two. It was under this name that we find in the management 
literature. This approach considers that any human collective, market organization 
(public, private, non-profit advocacy group, network) is in any way an institution, 
or has a very high proportion of so-called institutional characteristics, and should 
be approached as tel. To explain the context, it is only specific concepts in 
sociology. It is even ready to give an explanation of the economic institutions to 
economic sociologists, if it makes them happy. It is this approach that is closest to 
the theory of the financial institutions. Some of its most prominent representatives 
are working elsewhere in the administration faculties (Department of 
Management). The third sociological approach attempts to explain the institutional 
contexts through a combination of sociological concepts borrowed from political 
science (power) concepts rather than the economy (efficiency). It is an integral part 
of current sociology, and would be considered marginal in the political science 
department. Give him the epithet here sociopolitical. 
These three approaches are in fact largely complementary. Each share the same 
conceptual basis, fortified or not, sociology, and explores different aspects of the 
reality of institutions. A nice theoretical breakthrough here would achieve 
seamlessly integrate the contributions of these three trends in one. Our area would 
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be the first to benefit. Notice that the first and third approaches are attempts 
hybridization, and no attempts to interdisciplinarity. They are made by sociologists 
that enrich their conceptual borrowing by some external directory disciplines but 
remain sociologists. These sociologists interdisciplinarity does not come, they do 
not seek to develop a common vocabulary between their discipline and those they 
are borrowing. In contrast, the second approach is Aboriginal. It builds on a long 
tradition in sociology, functionalism, and a once glorious but somewhat fallen out 
of favor since the 1970s, and the contemporary institutionalists have successfully 
revived by modernizing epistemology. Small focus: this brief overview shows that 
the term “institutionalist” is used in very different contexts, and the authors often 
do not address speech. There is no “institutionalist school” as such. There is only 
one discipline to another, a common interest in the explanation of the formation 
and functioning of institutions (that is to say collectively shared rules that allow the 
coordination of a decision context) rather for closer study objects such as 
productivity or divorce rates. Here the similarities end. Everything else is scientific 
controversy. Added to this is the fact that the term “institutional” is also commonly 
used to designate blurred realities of sub-societal level (institutional is what is 
established by the State or imposed by the management of the university, or which 
enjoyed a lasting notoriety). 
Let's take a break and practice illustrates the concepts discussed so far by applying 
them to two phenomena. Both are crucial to the positioning of the financial 
institutions against their decision context. The first example concerns public 
regulation (all laws and regulations that apply to businesses). Even if the subject is 
conventionally considered as belonging to the economy, we see that regulation is a 
hybrid object. It is both economical (it seeks to influence the maximizing behavior 
of firms), political (it is imposed by the state and has its source in the law), and 
social (this is an institution that is based on rules and values of living together). 
Three explanatory approaches are proposed. The first (public interest) is based on 
the welfare economics, the second (private interests) on the new institutional 
economics, and the third (control systems) on the so-called orthodox institutional 
economics. Nothing new in these approaches. We are thus faced with three hardly 
compatible approaches to explain the same phenomenon: we are immersed in the 
socio-political. The first is the most logical, considering the fundamental 
assumptions of neoclassical economics. The second is the more cynical, and his 
posture is clearly anti-state (although some authors deny it). The third is more 
pragmatic, and its position is pro-state. We are therefore not in sub-particle physics 
is hard to imagine that the scientific results of physicists depend on their political 
beliefs (“the theory of relativity is it left or right?”). Yet this is the case in the social 
science of economics. 
The second illustration concerns the concept of issues. A challenge for us will be a 
societal problem of increasing intensity requiring the attention of financial 
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institutions. As it grows, then stabilizing, an issue often acquires the status of an 
institution (a problem arises a social pressure to settle, the state finally passed a 
law). To study this phenomenon apparently typical social, we will focus this time 
sociological approaches. However, we quickly discover that here too, appearances 
are deceiving. One issue involves players, so power struggles (political) around the 
allocation of resources (economic). Our goal is to understand how issues are 
constructed. To do this, logically enough, we use the so-called epistemology puzzle 
from our point of view (some say “constructivist”, but we leave this term PDC 
psychology, to avoid confusion). It is somewhat new compared to some of the 
approaches we have studied so far, because it makes a great place for players. It 
allows us to address realistically the issues faced by financial institutions. This 
approach is “actionist”, that is to say, based on the interaction between the work of 
actors and their performances. It assumes that reality is before “socially 
constructed.” Whatever has been defined as such. What is problematic has also 
been defined as such. What is problematic has also been defined as such. This 
approach will teach us and a decision is not a problem as long as it has not been 
revealed and supported by stakeholders with sufficient social and media power to 
impose their view of social reality. We find this approach later when we discuss the 
topic of creative innovative organization's decision-making context. Nothing 
prevents the innovative organization indeed behave like any social actor to 
influence the construction of the issues that challenge based on its own interests, 
either alone or with others. 
Three suggestions are emerging here. First, let's make sure we understand why this 
approach is particularly useful for studying complex processes where 
heterogeneous actors pursue conflicting interests. Retain it on our list of 
epistemologies that we might need. Secondly, let us also that we understand how 
this approach is radically opposed to epistemology institutionalist. Finally, make 
the difference between this approach and other approaches based on the players 
that we have seen so far. After reflecting on the various geometries with which we 
can realize the object “decision context”, we now turn directly available theories to 
analyze the interface financial institutions/ decision-making context. These parties 
are two sides of the same coin. For pedagogical reasons, consider them initially as 
temporarily inconsistent. Attach us to understand what makes them different. One 
seeks to overcome this dichotomy by using theories emerging, often little-known 
management, but that seem specific to bypass certain limitations of the classical 
theories. 
With each other, we enter fully into the subject of the financial institutions/ 
decision-making context. This section is devoted to theories that posit that the gap 
between innovative organization and decision-making context, the decision-making 
environment dominates. Two quite different approaches to share this perspective. 
Both start from the point of view - long held as common sense - that the innovative 
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organization is ultimately dominated by his decision context, that is to say, if it 
does not fit the requirements of this decision context, at least in the long term, it 
will disappear. We recognize here the old premise of microeconomics. Where the 
two approaches differ is in the nature of the adaptation. 
The first approach considers the innovative organization is primarily dependent on 
external technical and economic factors. Within this approach, several points of 
view are possible. For some authors, it is the requirements of market structures that 
dominate (competitive markets, for example), for others, critical resources that 
innovative organization must obtain to survive (resource dependence), while others 
Again, the existence of a “niche” for the innovative organization to reproduce 
(demography financial institutions [Population Ecology]). These currents are 
distinguished by their level of analysis (individual vs. population). They also differ 
in their degree of determinism: temperate in the case of resource dependence (face 
their external dependence, the leaders have some leeway), very strong in the 
Demography of financial institutions (disappears when the niche, innovative 
organization and his ilk in the same niche disappear in turn, regardless of the 
management team in place). 
The second approach places the dependence of the most innovative organization in 
socio-cultural as technical and economic factors. This is the institutional approach - 
once again - but this time financial institutions theory, rather than sociology itself. 
She professes that all financial institutions depend at least in part on external 
sociopolitical support and should be given enough attention to continue without 
problems. For most of today's financial institutions, the preservation of financial 
institutions legitimacy and that of ethical integrity is particularly important, 
sometimes more than the market (see the case of Nike or Arthur Andersen, the first 
fight since 15 years to restore its legitimacy skinned, the second disappeared a few 
weeks after a scandal). In this case professional bodies (accountants, doctors, etc.), 
The law grants a monopoly economic actors who meet certain conditions of 
legitimacy. For some financial institutions, the external socio-political support is 
even a condition of survival, regardless of their economic efficiency. This is the 
case of many financial institutions, or “permanently fail”, which is known for 
example that they can survive for years through grants. Again, we have to make 
shades on the degree of determinism of financial institutions/ decision context 
relationship. The role of agents (decision makers) in relation to external forces in 
explaining financial institutions decisions had been very controversial debates. Do 
we understand! The two approaches basically say the same thing, but they do not 
say the same. Depending on whether we use one or the other, we will not follow 
the same plan of research, we do not collect the same data, we do not interrogate 
the same people, and we will not get the same results. 
Continue our analysis of the financial institutions interface / decision-making 
context, but change course. The innovative organization is no longer seen as 
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dominated by its decision context. Rather, it is designed as dominant, or at least as 
much involved in the formation of the decision context we can say that it is a 
creative (some say “co-creator”). The fifth part is a key turning point in the 
research. It is from this that we start to draft the “re-theorizing” announced for the 
last part. 
There is a rich literature on this subject, both in industrial economics in 
management (competitive strategy). This literature is still too focused on the 
relationship between state/ market financial institutions for our purposes. It is 
among sociologists that we will definitely take what we need, even if their work 
often owe nothing to the analysis of the innovative organization and its decision-
making context. Incidentally, this is the genius of management science. They are 
more ecumenical than doctrinaire. They always welcomed without qualms inputs 
from external disciplines, even those who struggle to recognize the legitimacy of 
management as “science” university, as soon as these contributions they seemed 
fruitful. Some theoretical approaches presented here timidly appeared at the doors 
of research management (encouraging the organization theory ends gradually 
escape from the psychic influence of microeconomics sign). 
We consider two major issues. The first is that the networks. Why? Because both 
the theory and practice of business consider more innovative organization that must 
be understood as a member of networks that are both constraints and opportunities 
for her. Consider innovative organization as a node in a network, among other 
nodes, is not trivial. It is moving the projector from the individual organization, 
facing a competitive decision-making context, even hostile, to the interagency. In 
this transfer, innovative organization loses its central position. It takes place among 
other members, whose interests are the same legitimate shot. The innovative 
organization is not only designed as a war machine, as is the case in economics or 
management strategy. It is also seen as an actor involved in the life of his decision-
making context, which are rooted in alliances, which must manage both conflict 
and cooperation. That's what we need to understand the multiple modes of 
interaction that develops innovative organization with its socio-political decision-
making context. 
This problem allows us to break deadlocks model alone against all heroic financial 
institutions, who fights for the sake of its own shareholders. It allows us to lead a 
more oriented stakeholder analysis, and to bridge the gap between traditional 
theory and new approaches to the stakeholders. It opens directly on new issues 
such as the inclusion of multiple rationalities, the integration of economic, social 
and political elements within the same social analysis, and of course business 
ethics, which is an important part the financial institutions relationship/ decision-
making context. This problem is an obvious instrumental utility to conduct more 
realistic and in line with the research theories today. It will not escape you; 
however, it also implies a political position, that of a democratic egalitarianism in 
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the status accorded to different socio-economic actors (all stakeholders have rights, 
not just shareholders). 
Within the issue of networks, we examine three approaches that focus on different 
aspects. The first approach is the oldest. It is static, and considers only the 
networks in their structural aspects, that is to say formal. It comes from the 
traditional structural-functionalist sociology. This approach leaves little room for 
actors. It is therefore not suitable for dynamic re-theorizing that makes the lion's 
share of decision makers, their representations and processes in which they are 
incurred. However, it provides us with key concepts to describe the reality of the 
networks. It also allows us to contrast well to the originality of the two following 
approaches. 
The second approach is a great place for players. It comes from economic 
sociology. It considers that economic actions are strongly embedded (“embedded”) 
in personal relationships based not only on economic interests, but also 
institutionalized behavior (particularly related to the culture of the players). Within 
these tissues relations, non-economic factors can significantly influence the 
expected behavior in economic theory, and sometimes even be dominant. This 
approach is defined as an intermediate position with respect to two major existing 
theoretical axes, which tend to despise the actor. On the one hand, traditional 
economic theories make the actor a “rational fool” (Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 1998) who lives in solitude with no other relationship than he is 
bound by contract profitable. On the other hand, sociological structural-
functionalist theories of inspiration, which is still the most used in management, 
make the actor a puppet orchestrated by stronger than her social processes. 
Between the two, we suggest the approach of embedding, are real human beings. In 
a study which recognizes the existence of multiple rationalities, understand that this 
approach cannot leave us indifferent. Halfway between the previous approach and 
the next, this approach remains largely structural (there studies established 
networks). 
The third network-based approach is that of sharing (Enrollment). It has other 
names, among which his own reluctant writers (especially “sociology of 
translation”, “theory of the actor-network” or “sociology of associations”). It is still 
very exotic management, since it is derived from a cross between 
ethnomethodology (an anthropological sub-branch of the sociology of the actor) 
and the sociology of science (socio-technical systems). Its merit is twofold. On the 
one hand, it brings the concept of network dynamics it lacks in previous 
approaches. Prior to exist, a network must be built, and it particularly enterprising 
players must enlist multiple partners. On the other hand, this approach achieves 
some interdisciplinarity, which is a tour de force in contemporary sociology. We 
ourselves need this interdisciplinary (not to be confused with multidisciplinarity, 
which is the juxtaposition of expertise without integrating them into a common 
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vocabulary) because we want to treat all the factors considered in isolation from 
other disciplines. In this approach, we see actors build the networks they establish. 
Their autonomy is initially greater than in the other approaches. As and when they 
reach their goal, their networks stabilize around them, and begin to limit their 
autonomy. This proactive approach is well suited to management science, 
especially to those who see management as a permanent form of project 
management. Note that unlike its competitors, the “actor-network” approach does 
not differentiate between human actors (you, me, all bipeds) and non-human actors 
(machines, texts, St. Jacques shells), provided they have an effect on other parts of 
the network to which they belong. We will see why this original design allows us 
to address some of the thorniest problems in the couple financial institutions/ 
decision-making context, especially in the context of the challenges of sustainable 
development. 
After we looked at the epistemology of networks, we try to go further in the 
autonomy of the actor. A second problem will be introduced. We are now talking 
of “negotiated decision-making context,” since we consider that any decision-
making context is actually the result of negotiations between actors. You should 
hear this term in a broad sense, similar to that of deliberate interaction. Four 
approaches are discussed. They are complementary, but all start from a slightly 
different perspective, and each leads to different issues and methodologies. When 
you choose one, it closes the benefits of others, even if they all share the same 
desire to explain the decision-making system in force (the structures in which we 
operate) by the continuous involvement of stakeholders. Again, there are many 
other approaches to the constitution of the order, but those proposed seem 
particularly useful for our purposes. Many of them are new in management. It is up 
to tame, because none has been developed with the aim to better understand the 
multi interface/ decision-making context. 
The first approach is that of the negotiated order. It comes from the great tradition 
of interactionist sociology called Chicago. Why is there a social order, that is to say 
it stable arrangements between actors? Because these actors have negotiated the 
content of their relations. Why did they negotiate? Precisely because they need 
predictability in the relationship, especially in changing contexts. How long does 
this order? As long as the players continue. A strength of this approach is that it 
helps to explain either, with the same concepts, conflict and collaboration. We see 
the direct application we can do to study the order established between financial 
institutions and its partners. The second approach is new management. This is the 
theory of Economy of variables (also called Economies of scale). It comes from 
Paris, where she held for ten years a large body of research on the borderline 
between economics, financial institutions sociology and philosophy. She said part 
of the current conventions of Economics, an original attempt which aims to 
discover what are the “conventions” (rules) that allow the coordination of interests 
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between individuals in a world characterized by high uncertainty (and where such 
coordination cannot be done by explicit contracts). A rule of conventional type (or 
agreement) is opposed to the rules of contractual (eg explicit contracts) and rules 
binding model (e.g. laws), in that it is vague, of obscure origin, arbitrary and 
without legal sanction. It is, however, allowing cooperation where we did not 
expect. This approach also seeks to reconcile individual levels and institutional 
levels of analysis traditionally incompatible. 
We leave aside the least useful for us part of the economy of conventions, which 
are primarily interested in economic coordination. For the purposes of the course, 
we will focus on contributions of Economy of grandeur, which is closer to the 
players and the organization, so our epistemology. We will focus on how it 
manages to identify what are the logical that actors use when they need to reconcile 
irreconcilable interests a priori. The authors identified six logic, which they call 
“cities” or “worlds”, which are actually systems of justification themselves based 
on value systems most commonly invoked by the actors. This approach provides us 
with a useful operationalization of the concept of multiple rationalities. It also 
allows to significantly enriching the previous approach of negotiated order. In its 
relations with its partners, internal and external, the innovative organization is at 
the heart of this problem.  
The third approach involves the concrete action systems Crozier and Friedberg. It 
dates back to the 1970s, and is still very much alive. It was developed from case 
studies are limited to internal aspects of large bureaucratic firms (although Crozier 
could sometimes extend to the social phenomena), but it is rich in insights for our 
purposes. It offers an analysis of collective action similar to the previous, but with 
an emphasis on power relations between players. This is where it is useful to us 
because it goes further in this direction than the other approaches discussed this 
week. Taking into account this dimension is essential for us, since we consider that 
any relationship between the innovative organization and its stakeholders is a 
power relationship. Strap yourself in particular the concept of “concrete action 
system.” The latter approach is a bit abstruse, but it is very fashionable. It also 
comes from European sociology, specifically the United Kingdom. This is the 
approach of structuring Giddens. What interests us here is that it proposes the 
renewal of the relationship between the actor and the structure in which it takes 
place. Giddens attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable, and he succeeded. It starts 
from the premise that the sociological tradition provides two conflicting 
perspectives on these relationships. Some authors indeed structure constraint which 
requires the actor, while other authors are a product of human action. Giddens 
draws from all traditions that preceded it, and proposes to treat the structures both 
as a policy and as a product of the action. The “structure” is the process by which 
these structures are produced and reproduced. The approach also pays great 
attention to unexpected side effects, and often perverse decisions, a feature peculiar 
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to complex systems of action that we want to study. Giddens is not easy to 
understand, but his insights provide a better anchor the previous approaches, which 
are sometimes too tend to drift to an overstatement of cognitive or voluntarism, 
neglecting the contextual aspects of the action. We who are interested in the 
organization know that no strategy unfolds in a vacuum, and a good explanation of 
the financial institutions interface/ decision cannot ignore the context in which this 
structural interface is rooted. 
 
4. Analyzing and Synthesizing 
This journey through different epistemologies has allowed us to expand our 
theoretical repertoire. We can now refocus on innovative organization as level of 
analysis. This is more an exhortation than a finished product. By “theoretical 
restructuring” must include a new approach to understanding the financial 
institutions/ decision-making context, beyond the traditional model of economic 
rationality. By “puzzlisante” should be understood as based on the stakeholder 
approach, those who build the relationship in which the company is engaged. These 
players will receive the name of “stakeholders” are the stakeholders of modern 
management literature. We use specialized management literature as a base. Four 
themes are: 
− The first theme wants to show that interest in financial institutions / decision 
context relations leads us to restructure traditional notions of decision-making 
context, the innovative organization and boundaries of the financial institutions. 
We felt for some time it would take to go through this challenge. Specializing in 
the management literature now opens several concrete ways to achieve this. 
− First, it should be considered not only the innovative organization as an open 
system in its decision-making context, but also as “outgoing” organization, that is 
to say, in constant dialogue with the decision-making context. Apply this insight at 
the innovative organization.  
We start from a premise that should now be familiar. The decision context cannot 
be considered as an external data with which innovative organization must, willy-
nilly, compose. Instead, it must be conceived as a social construct, that is to say, as 
the result of ongoing interactions between different members of the decision-field 
to which it belongs. The innovative organization is not neutral in the decision-
making context. She is the co-creator. We can take the reasoning to argue that its 
prosperity depends largely on the type of decision-making environment that was 
able to choose or (co-) create. Note that the innovative organization here is neither 
dominant nor dominated by the decision context. It is interactive. It is of course 
limited by the institutional and political context in which it operates (dominated). It 
must be accepted (dominated) in the networks it has itself helped to build 
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(dominant, co-creator). The decision-making context of the firm is here conceived 
as a set of networks in which it is itself a stakeholder. But that's not all. The 
decision context is an entity under construction, deconstruction and reconstruction 
permanent. Structure that was theoretically in the past, the decision-making context 
is process. This is a complete reversal of perspective: given the decision context is 
built. This epistemological change cannot be done in isolation. It requires adjusting 
the epistemological status of the innovative organization to make coherent analysis 
between the two entities. All research involving innovative organization is 
necessarily based on an underlying theory that the researcher is aware or not. It 
must ensure that the theory on which it intends to base its analysis is consistent 
with the conceptualization of the decision context. Among the available theories, 
some are better suited than others to this analysis from the perspective of social 
construction. There are others and we choose: several combinations are possible, 
but must above all be consistent. 
The border issue between financial institutions/ decision context, i.e. the location of 
the interface between the two, now also becomes problematic. Historically, this 
issue has undergone several transformations. Organization theory in the early 20th 
century, which was dedicated solely to the research principles of internal 
operational efficiency, has long ignored. Then came the systemic approach, which 
opened the innovative organization's decision-making context, and therefore had to 
worry about the border between the two. However, the response was treated as 
evidence: was rejected in the decision context all relevant factors in the decision 
but outside the total control of the innovative organization. Today, innovative 
organization “extrovert” is so open about his decision context it is to include within 
its own walls some elements that were once considered part of the decision-making 
context. The question of the boundary between the two is therefore now problem. 
This new problem however is quite exciting in theory, researchers failed to notice 
the subject. It also raises a methodological challenge. On the ground, we will 
decide which is part of our system and which should be ignored. The number and 
quality of interviews depend on the theoretical model that we would have chosen. 
Finally, a new track is open to us, that the organization has the innovative 
“citizen.” It is not only asked to be innovative efficient organization, we also want 
it assumes national social and ethical responsibilities of a local nature, and 
increasingly international. Globalization calls again into question the status of the 
innovative organization and its borders. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Gradually, driven by the reality of change, we thus come to a Copernican 
revolution in the theory of relations between financial institutions and decision 
context. Standards for new perspectives on the role of the financial institutions, it is 
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not the decision-making environment that revolves around the sun financial 
institutions is the innovative organization that blends in a decision-making context 
in which it became one of constituents. Note that this reversal was anticipated in 
1965 by Emery and Trist in a prophetic article, but it is only recently that we began 
to theorize in this direction. Go to the second theme, the theory of “interested” or 
“stakeholders” (stakeholder theory). Some would argue, probably rightly, that this 
is not a theory but a perspective, a bit like the “systems theory”, which has so 
excited researchers in the 60s. To be convinced, just look at the contortions that the 
authors take to the word “Theory” does not appear next to “Stakeholder” in the title 
of their publications (Stakeholder “Thinking”, “Engagement”, “Perspective“,“ 
Approach “, etc.). This is good news for doctoral students: there is a developing 
field that awaits their contributions. 
For us, a stakeholder is an actor, but it is a rather special player because he has a 
moral sense. It is both homo economicus (you must make a good crust), homo 
socialis (we all friends), political man (sometimes you have to elbow) and homo 
moralis (we do not live by bread). One of the ambitions of the theories in terms of 
stakeholders is to give a theoretical status in this homo with many faces, while the 
traditional disciplines have never considered that one of its dimensions at once. 
This is an urgent work remains to be done. All actionalist literature we have seen 
previously, especially on the social construction, we can help. However, it is 
insufficient because it generally underestimates the normative aspects of human 
behavior, especially the ethical elements. Two important issues arise very quickly. 
The first is theoretical: “What is a person? “And in particular, how does it differ 
from traditional sociological actor. The second is empirical: “How to identify the 
relevant stakeholders? “. As we would not have answered these two questions, we 
will not know who to interview on the spot. Better think before. However, take 
care: the “stakeholder theory” is a misleading thought. Simple in appearance, it 
poses very complex theoretical and philosophical problems as soon as one takes 
seriously. We soon discover that the answer to both questions is strongly related to 
personal political philosophy, or, if we are looking at the people who pay us. 
The third theme is inextricably linked to the previous one. It is the massive 
reintroduction of normative theory in organizations, where the concepts of values, 
ethics, legitimacy had largely disappeared. As for the decision context and the 
financial institutions study of the socio-political interface requires us again to 
reconsider the epistemological status of the managerial decision. Once seen only in 
the technical aspects of procedure, the decision should be seen today as the 
operationalization of a system of values. Decide, yes, but for whom, for what? 
How to justify to external stakeholders, including the logic of action and 
philosophies of life different from that advocated by the financial institutions, a 
decision is legitimate? In a world that recognizes the legitimacy of views 
(rationality) multiple of what is good or bad, desirable or not, everything is 
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questionable. Any decision must be justified and court stakeholders. The spread of 
the ideology and practices of sustainable development accelerates importance. 
These philosophical questions arise every day in the boards. They join a long 
tradition of Western philosophical reflection on human action (more than twenty-
five centuries of questions). For us, in practice, they manifest through ethical 
business concepts and legitimacy even more concretely, through the financial 
scandals of recent years. Why these scandals are produced? What did not work? 
Who is to blame?: In no morals, carefree shareholders who abdicated control over 
those stupid supposed to work for them; the incompetent State no longer provides 
its fundamental role of watchdog, society collectively become too permissive 
makers? How to avoid these scandals?: For more government regulation, more 
morality among policymakers, more control by stakeholders? These questions are 
about “normative” rather than “descriptive”: they involve the use of value systems 
on what to and what not to do, that is to say standards behavior. An innovative 
organization can survive only if it provides legitimacy (that is what always said 
sociological institutionalism). They had simply forgotten that the ethical standards 
are an essential dimension of legitimacy. Several normative models specially 
adapted to the management of philosophers training exist. These models are more 
or less compatible. Considerable work remains to be done to strengthen this area. 
We studied extensively the issue of standards with institutionalism differently 
branched. Now is the time to put them to the test to enhance the management 
literature. In the fourth issue, we approach the last central issue in the field of 
social management (“Social Issues in Management”), one of the “social business 
performance” (“Corporate Social Performance”). We are now equipped to address 
three critical issues: (1) How financial institutions do they manage their interface 
with their decision-making context? And (2) What is the performance “social” 
beyond the simple economic and financial performance? and (3) How can we 
measure this performance “social”? At this point, it is understood that economic 
performance is insufficient to ensure the sustainability of the financial institutions, 
at least for him to avoid problems. “The company” expects more “innovative 
organization”. But why is she exactly? What are the responsibilities of the modern 
innovative organization (“social responsibility”)? The innovative organization need 
to wait to be compelled to fulfill its social responsibilities? Where end economic 
responsibilities and where social responsibility begins? To what extent are they 
compatible? Is there a limit to what you may require financial institutions? Before 
whom the innovative organization is responsible for it (which stakeholders), to 
whom is it accountable? How can these accounts? How to measure results? How to 
validate? If you like the debates, these questions should we put water in the mouth. 
We understand that in a multiple rationalities world, the issue of “social 
performance of the innovative organization” is wide open to uncertainty. 
Everything depends on the status that is given to the innovative organization: 
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simple machine to produce cash register for shareholders, human community 
service of another larger community? Wait and see ...! 
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